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February 17, 2025

VIA ECF
The Honorable Dale E. Ho
United States District Court Judge
The Southern District of New York
40 Foley Square
New York, New York 10007

Re: Letter Motion to Appear as Amicus Curiae on Government's Motion to Dismiss *U.S. v. Eric Adams* 24 Cr. 556

Dear Judge Ho:

I. Preliminary Statement

I am a member of the bar of this Court. I formerly served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and am a member of the New York State Board of Directors of Common Cause.

This is submitted as a letter motion to be heard as an amicus curiae[1] on behalf of Common Cause[2] in opposition to the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") F. R. Crim. P., Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss without prejudice the prosecution captioned, U.S. v. Adams, 24 Cr. 556.

Rule 48(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment." The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the phrase "with leave of court" means the district court is empowered "to deny a Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest." *Rinaldi v. United States*, 434 U.S 22, 29, n.15 (1977); *U.S. v. Flynn*, 507 F. Supp.3d 116, 128 (D.C. 2020) ("the Court made it 'manifestly clear that [it] intended to clothe the federal courts with a discretion broad enough to protect the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice'").

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[1] *See, U.S. v. Flynn*, 507 F. Supp.3d 116, 124 (D.C. 2020) where the court in similar circumstances "appointed . . . [a private attorney] as amicus curiae to present arguments in opposition to the government's Rule 48(a) motion" where there was no party to argue against the government's position.

[2] Common Cause is a nonpartisan organization dedicated to protecting the integrity of U.S. election processes and making government at all levels more representative, open, and responsive to the interests of ordinary people. To that end, Common Cause routinely disseminates updates and news on current events relevant to its mission to its 1.2 million members who reside in all 50 states and in every congressional district.

First, there is overwhelming evidence from DOJ's own internal documents showing that the dismissal of the Adams indictment is not in the public interest and is part of a corrupt *quid pro quo* between Mayor Adams and the Trump administration. These internal documents show that in return for DOJ's dismissal of the indictment, Mr. Adams agreed to improperly assist the Trump administration in its immigration enforcement priorities.

A dismissal "without prejudice" is simply a sword of Damocles hanging over Adams, permitting the indictment to be re-filed at DOJ's discretion, to ensure Mr. Adams follows the administration's marching orders. Indeed, DOJ admitted in internal documents that this dismissal motion is not based on the proper grounds of innocence or lack of evidence.

Second, the motion to dismiss should be denied on the basis of the bad faith reflected by the inconsistent and threatening statements made by the Acting Deputy Attorney General to the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York after she refused his directive to dismiss the indictment.

II. DOJ's Motion to Dismiss Is Part of a Corrupt *Quid Pro Quo* Bargain

Exhibit A annexed to this letter is a February 10, 2025, DOJ memo from Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove, Trump's former criminal defense lawyer, to Danielle R. Sassoon, the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, directing her to dismiss the Adams indictment. That memo, outlining the reasons for the dismissal, conclusively shows the corrupt bargain between the Trump administration and Mr. Adams. Some of the same rationales for dismissal are repeated in the motion to dismiss before this Court.

Remarkably, nowhere in the memo or in the motion before this Court does DOJ claim that Mr. Adams is innocent of the charges, though Mr. Adams has publicly asserted that DOJ's decision to dismiss his indictment shows he is innocent of the charges. Rather, the memo acknowledged that "[t]he Justice Department has reached this conclusion [to dismiss the indictment] without assessing the strength of the evidence or the legal theories on which the case is based." **Exhibit A**, p. 1.

DOJ's motion represents that "the Acting Deputy Attorney General [Bove] concluded that dismissal is necessary because of appearances of impropriety and risks of interference with the 2025 elections in New York City." This conclusion was purportedly reached "based on, among other things, review of a website maintained by a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and an op-ed published by that former U.S. Attorney." The former U.S. Attorney is Damien Williams.

The referenced website does nothing more than link to previously published news articles about the Adams prosecution. The Williams op-ed is a general opinion piece about "the sad state of New York government" and does not expressly mention Mr. Adams. DOJ does not explain, nor can it, how public articles already disseminated are improper or how a general opinion piece on New York government risks interfering "with the 2025 elections in New York City."

The Bove memo, **Exhibit A**, p. 1, shows just how bogus this purported justification for dismissal is. Mr. Bove's memo asserted that the indictment should be dismissed because "the timing of the charges and more recent public actions by the former US Attorney responsible for initiating the case have threatened the integrity of the proceedings, including by increasing prejudicial pretrial publicity that risks impacting potential witnesses and the jury pool." As support for his statement, Mr. Bove relied on

Mr. Adams' criticism of the Biden administration's "immigration policies before the charges were filed." Mr. Bove cites zero proof of such a causal connection.

Mr. Bove speculates that "the former US Attorney's public actions created appearances of impropriety," without specifying any proof in the memo. **Exhibit A**, p. 1. Mr. Bove made a feeble effort to provide such proof in a letter to Ms. Sassoon three days later on February 13, 2025, accepting her resignation as the Acting U.S. Attorney. The letter is annexed hereto as **Exhibit B**.

Mr. Bove asserted there was the creation of an appearance of impropriety with the conclusory politically charged statement that the investigation into Mr. Adams was "led by a former U.S. Attorney with deep connections to the former Attorney General who oversaw the weaponization of the Justice Department." Mr. Bove also claimed that "in late - December 2024, the former U.S. Attorney launched a personal website- which closely resembles a campaign website--that touts articles about the ongoing prosecution of Mayor Adams." **Exhibit B,** pp. 3-4.

In a letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi, dated February 12, 2024, annexed to this letter as **Exhibit C**, Ms. Sassoon responded to Mr. Bove's unsupported claims. As to Mr. Williams' involvement in the Adams prosecution, she informed Attorney General Bondi that "[t]he investigation began before Mr. Williams took office, he did not manage the day-to-day investigation, and the charges in this case were recommended or approved by four experienced career prosecutors, the Chiefs of the SDNY Public Corruption Unit, and career prosecutors at the Public Integrity Section of the Justice Department. Mr. Williams's decision to ratify their recommendations does not taint the charging decision." **Exhibit C**, p. 4.

Ms. Sassoon wrote that "[r]egarding the timing of the indictment, the decision to charge in September 2024 — nine months before the June 2025 Democratic Mayoral Primary and more than a year before the November 2025 Mayoral Election- complied in every respect with longstanding Department policy regarding election year sensitivities and the applicable Justice Manual provisions."

She further wrote that "I am not aware of any instance in which the Department of Justice has concluded that an indictment brought this far in advance of an election is improper because it may be pending during an election cycle, let alone that a validly returned and factually supported indictment should be dismissed on this basis." **Exhibit C**, p. 4. DOJ provides no evidence in its motion to the contrary.

There is nothing in the Bove memo or Mr. Bove's other attempts to support his statement that a proper jury could not be assembled through a normal voir dire process of the court questioning individual jurors as to whether each can be fair and impartial. The fact the trial was scheduled before the June Democratic primary is not relevant since, as Ms. Sassoon explained, "Adams has selected the timing of the trial." **Exhibit C,** p. 3.

In its motion, DOJ further argues the false claims that Mr. Bove "also concluded that continuing these proceedings would interfere with the defendant's ability to govern in New York City, which poses unacceptable threats to public safety, national security, and related federal immigration initiatives and policies." DOJ's motion represents that Mr. Bove "reached that conclusion after learning, among other things, that as a result of these proceedings, Mr. Adams has been denied access to sensitive information that the Acting Deputy Attorney General believes is necessary for Adams to govern and to help protect the City." Mr. Bove's memo to Ms. Sassoon raises a similar bogus argument. **Exhibit B**, p. 6.

Mr. Adams has publicly argued that the indictment has not interfered with his official mayoral duties. It is also telling that DOJ does not provide any details of the "sensitive information" Mr. Adams allegedly lacks because of his indictment or how having such information would have made any difference in his ability to perform his duties as mayor.

The Bove memo, as reflected in the relief sought in DOJ's motion to dismiss, "directed" the Acting US Attorney in the Southern District of New York to dismiss Mr. Adams' indictment "without prejudice." Mr. Bove's memo explained that "the matter shall be reviewed by the confirmed U.S Attorney in the Southern District of New York, following the November 2025 mayoral election." **Exhibit A**, p.1[3]. This qualification on the dismissal provides the Trump administration with potent leverage over Mr. Adams to ensure he follows the administration's directives or else the indictment will be reinstated.

Mr. Bove attempted in footnote 1 to the memo to dispel such a corrupt bargain. He made the self-serving statement that "the Government is not offering to exchange dismissal of a criminal case for Adams's assistance on immigration enforcement." **Exhibit A**, p. 2.

However, the entirety of Mr. Bove's memo, further supported by the bogus representations in the motion to dismiss, is powerful evidence of a corrupt *quid pro quo* bribery scheme – the *quid* being the dismissal of the charges against Mr. Adams without prejudice in return for the *quo* of total control over Adams under the threat of reinstating his indictment if he does not perform his duties as the Mayor of New York City to the favor of the Trump administration.

This bribery scheme is shockingly detailed in Ms. Sassoon's letter to Attorney General Bondi, **Exhibit C**, p. 3, in which she wrote, "Adam's advocacy should be called out for what it is: an improper offer of immigration enforcement assistance in exchange for a dismissal of his case." In footnote 1 of Ms. Sassoon's letter, Ms. Sassoon recounted to Attorney General Bondi a meeting that she attended at DOJ on January 31, 2025, "with Mr. Bove, Adams's counsel, and members" of the Office of the Southern District of New York. Ms. Sassoon wrote that "Adams's attorneys repeatedly urged what amounted to a *quid pro quo*, indicating that Adams would be in a position to assist with the Department's enforcement priorities only if the indictment were dismissed."

To conceal this meeting from public scrutiny, Ms. Sassoon revealed that "Mr. Bove admonished a member of my team who took notes during that meeting and directed the collection of those notes at the meeting's conclusion."

III. Mr. Bove's Bad Faith Is Demonstrated by His Inconsistent Statements in Response to Sassoon's Refusal to Dismiss the Adams Indictment

In his February 10th memo to Ms. Sassoon, Mr. Bove had written that "this directive in no way calls into question the integrity and efforts of the line prosecutors responsible for the case, or your efforts in leading those prosecutors in connection with a matter you inherited." **Exhibit A**, p. 1.

But three days later, on February 13th, in response to Ms. Sassoon's "refusal to comply with . . . [his] instructions," **Exhibit C**, p. 1, Mr. Bove unleashed a full-frontal attack on the U.S. Attorney's Office

[3] Mr. Bove also directed Ms. Sassoon that "[t]here shall be no further targeting of Mayor Adams or additional investigative step prior to that review."

with a series of false accusations that contradicted his statements made three days earlier in his memo by "call[ing] into question the integrity and efforts of the" Office.

Mr. Bove wrote that "by 2024 your office's work on the case was extremely problematic." **Exhibit C**, p. 5. Mr. Bove also asserted without evidence that there was "questionable behavior reflected in certain of the prosecution team's decisions" and threatened Ms. Sassoon that this "questionable behavior" "will be addressed in the forthcoming investigations" to "evaluate your conduct." **Exhibit C**, p. 1, 7.

Mr. Bove further wrote that prosecutors had tried to bait Mr. Adams, who was represented by counsel, into making "unprotected statements" under false pretenses. **Exhibit C**, p. 8. No evidence was cited for this statement. Mr. Bove went on to disparage the prosecution, claiming "[t]he case turns on factual and legal theories that are, at best, extremely aggressive." **Exhibit C**, p. 7. If that were so, Mr. Adams' motions to dismiss his indictment would have been granted but were instead denied.

Mr. Bove also upped his false attack on the previous U.S. Attorney, Williams, who had approved the filling of the Adams indictment. In his February 10th memo, Mr. Bove told Ms. Sassoon that "the former U.S. Attorney" "threatened the integrity of the proceedings, including by increasing prejudicial pretrial publicity." **Exhibit A**, p. 1. Three days later Mr. Bove changed his tune and called it "a politically motivated prosecution." **Exhibit C**, p. 1.

Mr. Bove's shift in strategy to attack the integrity of the U.S. Attorney's Office can only be explained as a further corrupt effort to take retribution against Ms. Sassoon for not signing the motion to dismiss the complaint and as a warning to others refusing to sign the motion to dismiss the complaint.

IV. Under Rule 48(a), This Court Should Deny the Government's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment

The addition of the phrase "with leave of court" in Rule 48(a) provides this Court with a sound legal basis to deny DOJ's motion on the ground that its dismissal motion is central to this corrupt bargain between DOJ and Mr. Adams.

In *U.S. v. Flynn*, 507 F. Supp.3d at 127, the court recognized that "the text and history of Rule 48(a), as well as precedent in this and other circuits, demonstrate that courts have the authority to review unopposed Rule 48(a) motions." One of the reasons for Rule 48(a) providing the district court a role in determining whether an indictment should be dismissed is because there was an existing "perception that prosecutors were seeking dismissals for politically well-connected defendants led some judges to 'feel complicit in dealings they deemed corrupt.'"

V. Conclusion

With the Government agreeing with Mr. Adams to dismiss the indictment, no party before the Court is representing the public interest. We respectfully ask the Court to appoint a special counsel to advise the Court in resolving this unfortunate matter.

Most obviously, the Court should deny the motion to dismiss. In addition, it may consider the following: allowing discovery of the DOJ with respect to its decision-making in this matter; directing Mr. Bove to appear in person to explain his position; sanctioning DOJ and/or Mr. Bove personally for making improper and unethical demands on prosecutors in New York and Washington.

The Court may also consider appointing an independent special prosecutor to continue the prosecution of Mr. Adams in this Court, *see*, *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.*, 481 U.S. 787, 794-802 (1987), and ordering that the special prosecutor have access to grand jury materials and other evidence assembled by the SDNY.

Respectfully submitted,

Nathaniel (Nick) H. Akerman
Attorney for Common Cause

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

Washington, DC 20530

February 10, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FROM: THE ACTING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL GB3 2/10/25

SUBJECT: Dismissal Without Prejudice of Prosecution of Mayor Eric Adams

You are directed, as authorized by the Attorney General, to dismiss the pending charges in *United States v. Adams*, No. 24 Cr. 556 (SDNY) as soon as is practicable, subject to the following conditions: (1) the defendant must agree in writing to dismissal without prejudice; (2) the defendant must agree in writing that he is not a prevailing party under the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 105-119 (Nov. 26, 1997); and (3) the matter shall be reviewed by the confirmed U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York, following the November 2025 mayoral election, based on consideration of all relevant factors (including those set forth below). There shall be no further targeting of Mayor Adams or additional investigative steps prior to that review, and you are further directed to take all steps within your power to cause Mayor Adams' security clearances to be restored.

The Justice Department has reached this conclusion without assessing the strength of the evidence or the legal theories on which the case is based, which are issues on which we defer to the U.S. Attorney's Office at this time. Moreover, as I said during our recent meetings, this directive in no way calls into question the integrity and efforts of the line prosecutors responsible for the case, or your efforts in leading those prosecutors in connection with a matter you inherited. However, the Justice Department has determined that dismissal subject to the above-described conditions is necessary for two independent reasons.

First, the timing of the charges and more recent public actions by the former U.S. Attorney responsible for initiating the case have threatened the integrity of the proceedings, including by increasing prejudicial pretrial publicity that risks impacting potential witnesses and the jury pool. It cannot be ignored that Mayor Adams criticized the prior Administration's immigration policies before the charges were filed, and the former U.S. Attorney's public actions created appearances of impropriety that implicate the concerns raised in the Attorney General's February 5, 2025 memorandum regarding *Restoring The Integrity and Credibility of the Department of Justice*, as well as in Executive Order 14147, entitled *Ending The Weaponization*

Of The Federal Government. These actions and the underlying case have also improperly interfered with Mayor Adams' campaign in the 2025 mayoral election. *See* Justice Manual § 9-85.500, entitled *Actions that May Have an Impact on an Election*.

Second, the pending prosecution has unduly restricted Mayor Adams' ability to devote full attention and resources to the illegal immigration and violent crime that escalated under the policies of the prior Administration. We are particularly concerned about the impact of the prosecution on Mayor Adams' ability to support critical, ongoing federal efforts "to protect the American people from the disastrous effects of unlawful mass migration and resettlement," as described in Executive Order 14165.[1] Accomplishing the immigration objectives established by President Trump and the Attorney General is every bit as important—if not more so—as the objectives that the prior Administration pursued by releasing violent criminals such as Viktor Bout, the "Merchant of Death."[2] Accordingly, based on these additional concerns that are distinct from the weaponization problems, dismissal without prejudice is also necessary at this time.

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[1] Your Office correctly noted in a February 3, 2025 memorandum, "as Mr. Bove clearly stated to defense counsel during our meeting [on January 31, 2025], the Government is not offering to exchange dismissal of a criminal case for Adams's assistance on immigration enforcement."

[2] According to an October 2024 *Wall Street Journal* article, Bout has already started to participate in arms deals again, including negotiations with representatives of Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/putins-merchant-of-death-is-back-in-the-arms-business-this-time-selling-to-the-houthis-10b7f521.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

February 13, 2025

Via Email & Hand Delivery
Danielle Sassoon
Acting U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY

Re: United States v. Adams, No. 24 Cr. 556 (S.D.N.Y.)

Ms. Sassoon:

In response to your refusal to comply with my instruction to dismiss the prosecution of Mayor Eric Adams, I write to notify you of the following:

First, your resignation is accepted. This decision is based on your choice to continue pursuing a politically motivated prosecution despite an express instruction to dismiss the case. You lost sight of the oath that you took when you started at the Department of Justice by suggesting that you retain discretion to interpret the Constitution in a manner inconsistent with the policies of a democratically elected President and a Senate-confirmed Attorney General.

Second, you indicated that the prosecution team is aware of your communications with the Justice Department, is supportive of your approach, and is unwilling to comply with the order to dismiss the case. Accordingly, the AUSAs principally responsible for this case are being placed on off-duty, administrative leave[1] pending investigations by the Office of the Attorney General[2] and the Office of Professional Responsibility, both of which will also evaluate your conduct. At

[1] This leave status will remain in effect until further notice. This is not a disciplinary or adverse action, and the AUSAs will continue to receive full salary and benefits during administrative leave. While the AUSAs are in an off-duty status, they are not to use their government-issued laptop, phone, and ID badge/PIV card to access duty stations or any other Federal facility unless explicitly directed to do so. While on administrative leave, if contacted by management, the AUSAs must respond by phone or email no later than the close of business the following business day.

[2] The investigation by the Office of the Attorney General will be conducted pursuant to, *inter alia*, Executive Order 14147, entitled *Ending the Weaponization of the Federal Government*, and on the basis of the Attorney General's February 5, 2025 memorandum regarding *Restoring the Integrity and Credibility of the Department of Justice*.

the conclusion of these investigations, the Attorney General will determine whether termination or some other action is appropriate.

Based on attendance at our recent meetings, I understand the relevant AUSAs to be Hagan Scotten and Derek Wikstrom. If either of these AUSAs wished to comply with my directive but was prohibited from doing so by you or the management of your office, or if these AUSAs wish to make me aware of other mitigating considerations they believe are relevant, they can contact my office directly. The Justice Management Division and EOUSA have taken steps to remove access to electronic devices, and I ask that you and the AUSAs cooperate with those efforts and preserve all electronic and hard copy records relating to this matter whether they are stored on official or personal devices.

Third, under your leadership, the office has demonstrated itself to be incapable of fairly and impartially reviewing the circumstances of this prosecution. Therefore, the prosecution of Mayor Adams is transferred to the Justice Department, which will file a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. My prior directive regarding no further targeting of Mayor Adams or additional investigative steps related to this matter remains in place.

I. Background

On January 20, 2025, in Executive Order 14147, President Trump established the following policy: "It is the policy of the United States to identify and take appropriate action to correct past misconduct by the Federal Government related to the weaponization of law enforcement." In a February 5, 2025 memorandum setting forth the Department's general policy regarding zealous advocacy on behalf of the United States, the Attorney General stated:

> [A]ny attorney who because of their personal political views or judgments declines to sign a brief or appear in court, refuses to advance good-faith arguments on behalf of the Administration, or otherwise delays or impedes the Department's mission will be subject to discipline and potentially termination, consistent with applicable law.

Your Office was not exempted from the President's policy or the Attorney General's memorandum.

On February 10, 2025, I directed you to dismiss the prosecution of Mayor Adams based on well-founded concerns regarding weaponization, election interference, and the impediments that the case has imposed on Mayor Adams' ability to govern and cooperate with federal law enforcement to keep New York City safe. My February 10, 2025 memorandum indicated that I acted pursuant to the authorization of the Attorney General. The mechanism for seeking dismissal is Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Note 2 to Rule 48 explains that "[t]he rule confers *the power to file a dismissal by leave of court on the Attorney General*, as well as on the United States attorney, since under existing law the Attorney General exercises 'general superintendence and direction' over the United States attorneys." *See* 28 U.S.C. § 509 ("All

functions of other officers of the Department of Justice and all functions of agencies and employees of the Department of Justice are vested in the Attorney General . . . ."); *see also* 28 C.F.R. § 0.15(b).

Prior to issuing the February 10, 2025 memorandum, I reviewed public filings in this matter, and your office's prosecution memoranda and classified submissions. I met with you and the prosecution team, held a separate meeting that involved you, the prosecution team, and defense counsel, and then met with you privately in my office.[3] During those meetings, I invited written submissions from both sides, and I carefully reviewed those submissions. Thus, your recent suggestions about a lack of process around the Justice Department's decision are not grounded in reality.

You have not complied with the clear directives in my February 10, 2025 memorandum. Further, you made clear that you did not intend to do so during telephone calls with myself and Chad Mizelle, the Attorney General's Chief of Staff, on February 11, 2025, as well as in a written submission to the Attorney General that day. You also stated that the prosecution team had reviewed your letter to the Attorney General, and that they would not file a motion to dismiss the case.

At approximately 1:50 p.m. today, you tendered your resignation via email.

II. Discussion

The weaponization finding in my February 10, 2025 memorandum was made pursuant to a policy set forth by President Trump, who is the only elected official in the Executive Branch, in connection with a decision that was authorized by the Senate-confirmed Attorney General of the United States, and entirely consistent with guidance issued by the Attorney General shortly after that confirmation. Your Office has no authority to contest the weaponization finding, or the second independent basis requiring dismissal set forth in my memorandum. The Justice Department will not tolerate the insubordination and apparent misconduct reflected in the approach that you and your office have taken in this matter.

A. Improper Weaponization

You are well aware of the Department's weaponization concerns regarding the handling of the investigation and prosecution of Mayor Adams. Those concerns include behavior that supports, at minimum, unacceptable appearances of impropriety and the politicization of your office. The investigation was accelerated after Mayor Adams publicly criticized President Biden's failed immigration policies, and led by a former U.S. Attorney with deep connections to the former

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[3] You correctly noted in your letter to the Attorney General that during the second meeting I questioned why a member of the prosecution team appeared to have been brought for the sole purpose of transcribing our discussion. You failed to note, however, that I made those comments in the context of a conversation about leaks relating to our deliberations.

Danielle Sassoon
Acting U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY

Attorney General who oversaw the weaponization of the Justice Department. Based on my review and our meetings, the charging decision was rushed as the 2024 Presidential election approached, and as the former U.S. Attorney appears to have been pursuing potential political appointments in the event Kamala Harris won that election.

After President Trump won the election, in late-December 2024, the former U.S. Attorney launched a personal website—which closely resembles a campaign website—that touts articles about the ongoing prosecution of Mayor Adams with titles such as "U.S. Attorney Damian Williams has come for the kings," "A mayor, a rapper, a senator, a billionaire: Meet the man who has prosecuted them all," and "Federal Prosecutor Damian Williams Flexes SDNY Power Against Eric Adams and Sean Combs." The former U.S. Attorney increased the appearances of impropriety by releasing an op-ed on January 16, 2025 entitled, "An indictment of the sad state of New York government." In that piece, he disparaged Mayor Adams with the following comment: "America's most vital city is being led with a broken ethical compass." The former U.S. Attorney also made what I reasonably interpreted as a reference to himself in that piece when he suggested that there was a need for "elected officials" willing to "disrupt the status quo."

You did not directly defend the former U.S. Attorney's behavior in response to a recent defense motion. Nor could you. His actions inappropriately politicized and tainted your office's prosecution, potentially permanently. Instead of addressing these concerns with the district court, you simply claimed that these actions were "beside the point." ECF No. 102 at 1. Not true. The actions by the former U.S. Attorney implicate the concerns that President Trump raised in Executive Order 14147, in connection with the prosecution of an elected official "who voiced opposition to the prior administration's policies." *Id.* The fact that the district court denied the defense motion does not establish that continuing the prosecution of Mayor Adams reflects an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Similarly, the fact that AUSAs convinced a grand jury to return an indictment based on a one-sided and inherently partial presentation of the evidence does not establish that the case was appropriate at the time, much less that it would be appropriate to continue to pursue the case based on events that occurred after the True Bill was returned.

The Justice Department will not ignore the fact that the timing of charges authorized by a former U.S. Attorney with apparent political aspirations interferes with Mayor Adams' ability to run a campaign in the 2025 election. Your reference to the schedule underlying the prosecution of Senator Robert Menendez is not in any way persuasive in light of the evidence-handling issues that arose in connection with that trial. If anything, that experience counsels in favor of more caution in these matters, not less. But the record does not reflect such caution. In October 2024, an AUSA responsible for the prosecution of Mayor Adams represented that the "first batch" of discovery in the case included "about 560 gigabytes" of data. ECF No. 31 at 18. Thus, as a trial date was negotiated, Mayor Adams was faced with an impossible choice between seeking to defend himself at a pre-election trial in the hopes that he could campaign based on exoneration, and taking

a reasonable amount of time to review the discovery and prepare his defense at a post-election trial. His acquiescence in the former option does not justify your office's decision.

In your letter to the Attorney General, you made the dubious choice to invoke Justice Scalia. As you are likely aware from your professional experience, Justice Scalia fully understood the risks of weaponization and lawfare:

> Nothing is so politically effective as the ability to charge that one's opponent and his associates are not merely wrongheaded, naive, ineffective, but, in all probability, "crooks." And nothing so effectively gives an appearance of validity to such charges as a Justice Department investigation and, even better, prosecution.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 713 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While the former U.S. Attorney is not a special counsel, Justice Scalia's *Morrison* dissent aptly summarized the Department's weaponization concerns here.

There is also great irony in your invocation of the famous speech by former Attorney General Robert Jackson. His remarks are unquestionably relevant here, but not in the way you have suggested. Jackson warned that "some measure of centralized control" over federal prosecutors was "necessary." Robert H. Jackson, *The Federal Prosecutor*, 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 18, 18 (1940). The senior leadership of the Justice Department exercises that control. Moreover, one of Jackson's concerns was that "the most dangerous power of the prosecutor" arises from the risk that the prosecutor would "pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted." *Id.* at 19.

> It is in this realm—in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass . . . that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor himself.

Id. Regardless of how the investigation of Mayor Adams was initiated, by 2024 your office's work on the case was extremely problematic in that regard.

Finally, your suggestion that President Trump should issue a pardon to Mayor Adams reveals that your office's insubordination is little more than a preference to avoid a duty that you regard as unpleasant and politically inconvenient. Your oath to uphold the Constitution does not permit you to substitute your policy judgment for that of the President or senior leadership of the Justice Department, and you are in no position to suggest that the President exercise his exclusive Article II authority to make your job easier.

For all of these reasons, dismissal is necessary in the interests of justice. Your refusal to recognize that fact and comply with my directive has only exacerbated the concerns I raised initially.

B. Interference With Mayor Adams' Ability To Govern

Your objections to the second basis for my February 10, 2025 directive—that the "pending prosecution has unduly restricted Mayor Adams' ability to devote full attention and resources to illegal immigration and violence crime"—are based on exaggerated claims that further illustrate your office's inability to grapple with the problems that this case actually presents.

As a result of the pending prosecution, Mayor Adams is unable to communicate directly and candidly with City officials he is responsible for managing, as well as federal agencies trying to protect the public from national security threats and violent crime. Mayor Adams has been denied a security clearance that limits his access to details of national security issues in the City he was elected to govern and protect. He cannot speak to federal officials regarding imminent security threats to the City. And he cannot fully cooperate with the federal government in the manner he deems appropriate to keep the City and its residents safe. This situation is unacceptable and directly endangers the lives of millions of New Yorkers. My directive to you reflected a determination by the Justice Department that these public safety risks greatly outweigh any interest you have identified. It is not for local federal officials such as yourself, who lack access to all relevant information, to question these judgments within the Justice Department's chain of command.

You claim to find my reference to Viktor Bout to be "alarming," but you have missed the fundamental point. Presidents frequently make policy decisions that the Justice Department is charged with implementing. In connection with the case against Bout, President Biden made a questionable decision to release the "Merchant of Death" from prison. Once the decision was made, it was the responsibility of the Department and your office to execute it. Regardless of anyone's personal views of the policy choice, an AUSA from your office filed a motion to assist in effectuating the decision. *See* ECF No. 130, *United States v. Bout*, No. 08 Cr. 365 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2022). That was your job here, and the job of the AUSAs assigned to the case. You have all violated your oaths by failing to do it. In no valid sense do you uphold the Constitution by disobeying direct orders implementing the policy of a duly elected President, and anyone romanticizing that behavior does a disservice to the nature of this work and the public's perception of our efforts.

You have also strained, unsuccessfully, to suggest that some kind of *quid pro quo* arises from my directive. This is false, as you acknowledged previously in writing. The Justice Department is charged with keeping people safe across the country. Your office's job is to help keep the City safe. But your actions have endangered it.

C. Rule 48 Dismissal

More broadly, you are simply incorrect to contend that there is no "valid" basis to seek dismissal. The contention is a dereliction of your duty to advocate zealously on behalf of the United States.

The main citation you have offered, *United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie*, 428 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), involved a motion based on "expense and inconvenience." *Id.* at 117. Those issues are not the drivers of this decision, as you know. Moreover, as you and your team undoubtedly learned during the research that led you to rely on a 57-year-old district court case:

> The government may elect to eschew or discontinue prosecutions for any number of reasons. Rarely will the judiciary overrule the Executive Branch's exercise of these prosecutorial decisions.

United States v. Blaszczak, 56 F.4th 230, 238 (2d Cir. 2022). In other words, the Attorney General has "a virtually absolute right" to dismiss this case. *United States v. Salim*, 2020 WL 2420517, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Any judicial discretion conferred by Rule 48(a) is "severely cabined" and likely limited to instances of "bad faith." *United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.*, 863 F.3d 125, 141 (2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up); *see also In re Richards,* 213 F.3d 773, 786 (2000) ("[T]he substantive reach of . . . [R]ule [48] appears to be effectively curtailed by the fact that even if the judge denies the motion to dismiss, there seems to be no way to compel the prosecutor to proceed."). Accordingly, any concerns that you and your office had about the prospects of a Rule 48 motion were not a valid basis for insubordination.

D. Additional Issues To Be Addressed

Finally, and to be clear, while I elected to address two particular dispositive concerns in my February 10, 2025 memorandum, I have many other concerns about this case.

The case turns on factual and legal theories that are, at best, extremely aggressive. For example, the district court explained that "[i]t is not inconceivable that the Second Circuit or the Supreme Court might, at some point in the future, hold that an 'official act' as defined in *McDonnell* is necessary under § 666, at least as to government actors." ECF No. 68 at 18-19. The district court also acknowledged that there is "some force" to Mayor Adams' challenges to the office's *quo* theories in the case. The "thing[s] of value" in this case are campaign contributions, which require heightened proof under *McCormick*, as the office knows from the challenges you encountered in connection with the decision to dismiss the *Benjamin* case.

There is also questionable behavior reflected in certain of the prosecution team's decisions, which will be addressed in the forthcoming investigations. Witnesses in the case do not appear to have been treated in a manner that is consistent with your claims about the seriousness of your

allegations against Mayor Adams. It is my understanding that, around the time the charges were filed, the prosecution team made representations to defense counsel regarding Mayor Adams' status in the investigation that are inconsistent with the Justice Manual's definitions of "target" and "subject." Justice Manual § 9-11.151. In the same period, despite having already started to draft a prosecution memo proposing to charge Mayor Adams, the prosecution team invited Mayor Adams to a proffer—in effect, baiting him to make unprotected statements after the line prosecutors had already decided to try to move forward with the case.

* * *

I take no pleasure in imposing these measures, initiating investigations, and requiring personnel from the Justice Department to come to your District to do work that your team should have done and was required to do. In this instance, however, that is what is necessary to continue the process of reconciliation and restoration of the Department of Justice's core values, as the Attorney General explained on February 5, 2025.

Respectfully,

/s/ *Emil Bove*

Emil Bove
Acting Deputy Attorney General

Cc: Matthew Podolsky
(Via Email)

Hagan Scotten
Derek Wikstrom
(By Hand Delivery)

U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney
Southern District of New York

The Jacob K. Javits Federal Building
26 Federal Plaza, 37th Floor
New York, New York 10278

February 12, 2025

BY EMAIL
The Honorable Pamela Jo Bondi
Attorney General of the United States
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20530

Re: United States v. Eric Adams, 24 Cr. 556 (DEH)

Dear Attorney General Bondi:

On February 10, 2025, I received a memorandum from acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove, directing me to dismiss the indictment against Mayor Eric Adams without prejudice, subject to certain conditions, which would require leave of court. I do not repeat here the evidence against Adams that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed federal crimes; Mr. Bove rightly has never called into question that the case team conducted this investigation with integrity and that the charges against Adams are serious and supported by fact and law. Mr. Bove's memo, however, which directs me to dismiss an indictment returned by a duly constituted grand jury for reasons having nothing to do with the strength of the case, raises serious concerns that render the contemplated dismissal inconsistent with my ability and duty to prosecute federal crimes without fear or favor and to advance good-faith arguments before the courts.

When I took my oath of office three weeks ago, I vowed to well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I was about to enter. In carrying out that responsibility, I am guided by, among other things, the Principles of Federal Prosecution set forth in the Justice Manual and your recent memoranda instructing attorneys for the Department of Justice to make only good-faith arguments and not to use the criminal enforcement authority of the United States to achieve political objectives or other improper aims. I am also guided by the values that have defined my over ten years of public service. You and I have yet to meet, let alone discuss this case. But as you may know, I clerked for the Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and for Justice Antonin Scalia on the U.S. Supreme Court. Both men instilled in me a sense of duty to contribute to the public good and uphold the rule of law, and a commitment to reasoned and thorough analysis. I have always considered it my obligation to pursue justice impartially, without favor to the wealthy or those who occupy important public office, or harsher treatment for the less powerful.

I therefore deem it necessary to the faithful discharge of my duties to raise the concerns expressed in this letter with you and to request an opportunity to meet to discuss them further. I cannot fulfill my obligations, effectively lead my office in carrying out the Department's priorities,

or credibly represent the Government before the courts, if I seek to dismiss the Adams case on this record.

A. The Government Does Not Have a Valid Basis To Seek Dismissal

Mr. Bove's memorandum identifies two grounds for the contemplated dismissal. I cannot advance either argument in good faith. As you know, the Government "may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a). "The principal object of the 'leave of court' requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment, *e.g.*, charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant's objection." *Rinaldi v. United States*, 434 U.S. 22, 30 n.15 (1977). "But the Rule has also been held to permit the court to deny a Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest." *Id.*; *see also* JM § 9-2.050 (reflecting Department's position that a "court may decline leave to dismiss if the manifest public interest requires it"). The reasons advanced by Mr. Bove for dismissing the indictment are not ones I can in good faith defend as in the public interest and as consistent with the principles of impartiality and fairness that guide my decision-making.

First, Mr. Bove proposes dismissing the charges against Adams in return for his assistance in enforcing the federal immigration laws, analogizing to the prisoner exchange in which the United States freed notorious Russian arms dealer Victor Bout in return for an American prisoner in Russia. Such an exchange with Adams violates commonsense beliefs in the equal administration of justice, the Justice Manual, and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The "commitment to the rule of law is nowhere more profoundly manifest" than in criminal justice. *Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct.*, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004) (alterations and citation omitted). Impartial enforcement of the law is the bedrock of federal prosecutions. *See* Robert H. Jackson, *The Federal Prosecutor*, 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 18 (1940). As the Justice Manual has long recognized, "the rule of law depends upon the evenhanded administration of justice. The legal judgments of the Department of Justice must be impartial and insulated from political influence." JM § 1-8.100. But Adams has argued in substance—and Mr. Bove appears prepared to concede—that Adams should receive leniency for federal crimes solely because he occupies an important public position and can use that position to assist in the Administration's policy priorities.

Federal prosecutors may not consider a potential defendant's "political associations, activities, or beliefs." *Id.* § 9-27.260; *see also Wayte v. United States*, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (politically motivated prosecutions violate the Constitution). If a criminal prosecution cannot be used to punish political activity, it likewise cannot be used to induce or coerce such activity. Threatening criminal prosecution even to gain an advantage in civil litigation is considered misconduct for an attorney. *See, e.g.*, D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion 339; ABA Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.6 ("A prosecutor should not use other improper considerations, such as partisan or political or personal considerations, in exercising prosecutorial discretion."). In your words, "the Department of Justice will not tolerate abuses of the criminal justice process, coercive behavior, or other forms of misconduct." Dismissal of the indictment for no other reason than to influence Adams's mayoral decision-making would be all three.

The memo suggests that the issue is merely removing an obstacle to Adams's ability to assist with federal immigration enforcement, but that does not bear scrutiny. It does not grapple with the differential treatment Adams would receive compared to other elected officials, much less other criminal defendants. And it is unclear why Adams would be better able to aid in immigration enforcement when the threat of future conviction is due to the possibility of reinstatement of the indictment followed by conviction at trial, rather than merely the possibility of conviction at trial. On this point, the possibility of trial before or after the election cannot be relevant, because Adams has selected the timing of his trial.

Rather than be rewarded, Adams's advocacy should be called out for what it is: an improper offer of immigration enforcement assistance in exchange for a dismissal of his case. Although Mr. Bove disclaimed any intention to exchange leniency in this case for Adams's assistance in enforcing federal law,[1] that is the nature of the bargain laid bare in Mr. Bove's memo. That is especially so given Mr. Bove's comparison to the Bout prisoner exchange, which was quite expressly a *quid pro quo*, but one carried out by the White House, and not the prosecutors in charge of Bout's case.

The comparison to the Bout exchange is particularly alarming. That prisoner swap was an exchange of official acts between separate sovereigns (the United States and Russia), neither of which had any claim that the other should obey its laws. By contrast, Adams is an American citizen, and a local elected official, who is seeking a personal benefit—immunity from federal laws to which he is undoubtedly subject—in exchange for an act—enforcement of federal law—he has no right to refuse. Moreover, the Bout exchange was a widely criticized sacrifice of a valid American interest (the punishment of an infamous arms dealer) which Russia was able to extract only through a patently selective prosecution of a famous American athlete.[2] It is difficult to imagine that the Department wishes to emulate that episode by granting Adams leverage over it akin to Russia's influence in international affairs. It is a breathtaking and dangerous precedent to reward Adams's opportunistic and shifting commitments on immigration and other policy matters with dismissal of a criminal indictment. Nor will a court likely find that such an improper exchange is consistent with the public interest. *See United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie ("Nederlandsche Combinatie")*, 428 F. Supp. 114, 116-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying Government's motion to dismiss where Government had agreed to dismiss charges against certain defendants in exchange for guilty pleas by others); *cf. In re United States*, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing a prosecutor's acceptance of a bribe as a clear example of a dismissal that should not be granted as contrary to the public interest).

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[1] I attended a meeting on January 31, 2025, with Mr. Bove, Adams's counsel, and members of my office. Adams's attorneys repeatedly urged what amounted to a *quid pro quo*, indicating that Adams would be in a position to assist with the Department's enforcement priorities only if the indictment were dismissed. Mr. Bove admonished a member of my team who took notes during that meeting and directed the collection of those notes at the meeting's conclusion.

[2] *See, e.g.*, https://thehill.com/homenews/3767785-trump-pans-prisoner-swap-brittney-griner-hates-our-country/.

Second, Mr. Bove states that dismissal is warranted because of the conduct of this office's former U.S. Attorney, Damian Williams, which, according to Mr. Bove's memo, constituted weaponization of government as defined by the relevant orders of the President and the Department. The generalized concerns expressed by Mr. Bove are not a basis to dismiss an indictment returned by a duly constituted grand jury, at least where, as here, the Government has no doubt in its evidence or the integrity of its investigation.

As Mr. Bove's memo acknowledges, and as he stated in our meeting of January 31, 2025, the Department has no concerns about the conduct or integrity of the line prosecutors who investigated and charged this case, and it does not question the merits of the case itself. Still, it bears emphasis that I have only known the line prosecutors on this case to act with integrity and in the pursuit of justice, and nothing I have learned since becoming U.S. Attorney has demonstrated otherwise. If anything, I have learned that Mr. Williams's role in the investigation and oversight of this case was even more minimal than I had assumed. The investigation began before Mr. Williams took office, he did not manage the day-to-day investigation, and the charges in this case were recommended or approved by four experienced career prosecutors, the Chiefs of the SDNY Public Corruption Unit, and career prosecutors at the Public Integrity Section of the Justice Department. Mr. Williams's decision to ratify their recommendations does not taint the charging decision. And notably, Adams has not brought a vindictive or selective prosecution motion, nor would one be successful. *See United States v. Stewart*, 590 F.3d 93, 121-23 (2d Cir. 2009); *cf. United States v. Biden*, 728 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (rejecting argument that political public statements disturb the "'presumption of regularity' that attaches to prosecutorial decisions").

Regarding the timing of the indictment, the decision to charge in September 2024—nine months before the June 2025 Democratic Mayoral Primary and more than a year before the November 2025 Mayoral Election—complied in every respect with longstanding Department policy regarding election year sensitivities and the applicable Justice Manual provisions. The Justice Manual requires that when investigative steps and charges involving a public official could be seen as affecting an election the prosecuting office must consult with the Public Integrity Section, and, if directed to do so, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General. *See* JM §§ 9-85.210, 9-85.500. As you are aware, this office followed this requirement. Further, the Justice Department's concurrence was unquestionably consistent with the established policies of the Public Integrity Section. *See, e.g.*, Public Integrity Section, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 85 (2017) (pre-election action may be appropriate where "it is possible to both complete an investigation and file criminal charges against an offender prior to the period immediately before an election"). The Department of Justice correctly concluded that bringing charges nine months before a primary election was entirely appropriate.

The timing of the charges in this case is also consistent with charging timelines of other cases involving elected officials, both in this District and elsewhere. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Robert Menendez*, 23 Cr. 490 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y.) (indictment in September 2023); *United States v. Duncan Hunter*, 18 Cr. 3677 (S.D. Cal.) (indictment in August 2018). I am not aware of any instance in which the Department has concluded that an indictment brought this far in advance of an election is improper because it may be pending during an electoral cycle, let alone that a validly returned and factually supported indictment should be dismissed on this basis.

When first setting the trial date, the District Court and the parties agreed on the importance of completing the trial *before* the upcoming mayoral election—including before the Democratic primary in which Adams is a candidate—so that the voters would know how the case resolved before casting their votes. (*See* Dkt. 31 at 38-44). Adams has decided that he would prefer the trial to take place before rather than after the June 2025 primary, notwithstanding the burden trial preparation would place on his ability to govern the City or campaign for re-election. But that is his choice, and the District Court has made clear that Adams is free to seek a continuance. (*See* Dkt. 113 at 18 n.6). The parties therefore cannot argue with candor that dismissing serious charges before an election, but holding open the possibility that those charges could be reinstated if Adams were re-elected, would now be other than "clearly contrary to the manifest public interest." *United States v. Blaszczak*, 56 F.4th 230, 238-39 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Bove's memo also refers to recent public actions by Mr. Williams. It is not my role to defend Mr. Williams's motives or conduct. Given the appropriate chronology of this investigation and the strength of the case, Mr. Williams's conduct since leaving government service cannot justify dismissal here. With respect to pretrial publicity, the District Court has already determined that Mr. Williams's statements have not prejudiced the jury pool. The District Court has also repeatedly explained that there is no evidence that any leaks to the media came from the prosecution team—although there is evidence media leaks came from the defense team—and no basis for any relief. (*See* Dkt. 103 at 3-6; Dkt. 49 at 4-21). Mr. Williams's recent op-ed, the Court concluded, generally talks about bribery in New York *State*, and so is not a comment on the case. (Dkt. 103 at 6 n.5). Mr. Williams's website does not even reference Adams except in the news articles linked there. (*See* Dkt. 99 at 3). And it is well settled that the U.S. Attorneys in this and other districts regularly conduct post-arrest press conferences. *See United States v. Avenatti*, 433 F. Supp. 3d 552, 567-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (describing the practice); *see also, e.g.*, "New Jersey U.S. Attorney's Office press conference on violent crime," YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAEDHQCE91A (announcing criminal charges against 42 defendants). In short, because there is in fact nothing about this prosecution that meaningfully differs from other cases that generate substantial pretrial publicity, a court is likely to view the weaponization rationale as pretextual.

Moreover, dismissing the case will amplify, rather than abate, concerns about weaponization of the Department. Despite Mr. Bove's observation that the directive to dismiss the case has been reached without assessing the strength of the evidence against Adams, Adams has already seized on the memo to publicly assert that he is innocent and that the accusations against him were unsupported by the evidence and based only on "fanfare and sensational claims." Confidence in the Department would best be restored by means well short of a dismissal. As you know, our office is prepared to seek a superseding indictment from a new grand jury under my leadership. We have proposed a superseding indictment that would add an obstruction conspiracy count based on evidence that Adams destroyed and instructed others to destroy evidence and provide false information to the FBI, and that would add further factual allegations regarding his participation in a fraudulent straw donor scheme.

That is more than enough to address any perception of impropriety created by Mr. Williams's personal conduct. The Bove memo acknowledges as much, leaving open the possibility

of refiling charges after the November 2025 New York City Mayoral Election. Nor is conditioning the dismissal on the incoming U.S. Attorney's ability to re-assess the charges consistent with either the weaponization rationale or the law concerning motions under Rule 48(a). To the contrary, keeping Adams under the threat of prosecution while the Government determines its next steps is a recognized reason for the *denial* of a Rule 48(a) motion. *See United States v. Poindexter*, 719 F. Supp. 6, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1989) (allowing Government to "to keep open the option of trying [certain] counts" would effectively keep the defendant "under public obloquy for an indefinite period of time until the government decided that, somehow, for some reason, the time had become more propitious for proceeding with a trial").

B. Adams's Consent Will Not Aid the Department's Arguments

Mr. Bove specifies that Adams must consent in writing to dismissal without prejudice. To be sure, in the typical case, the defendant's consent makes it significantly more likely for courts to grant motions to dismiss under Rule 48(a). *See United States v. Welborn*, 849 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1988) ("If the motion is uncontested, the court should ordinarily presume that the prosecutor is acting in good faith and dismiss the indictment without prejudice."). But Adams's consent—which was negotiated without my office's awareness or participation—would not guarantee a successful motion, given the basic flaws in the stated rationales for dismissal. *See Nederlandsche Combinatie,* 428 F. Supp. at 116-17 (declining to "rubber stamp" dismissal because although defendant did not appear to object, "the court is vested with the responsibility of protecting the interests of the public on whose behalf the criminal action is brought"). Seeking leave of court to dismiss a properly returned indictment based on Mr. Bove's stated rationales is also likely to backfire by inviting skepticism and scrutiny from the court that will ultimately hinder the Department of Justice's interests. In particular, the court is unlikely to acquiesce in using the criminal process to control the behavior of a political figure.

A brief review of the relevant law demonstrates this point. Although the judiciary "[r]arely will . . . overrule the Executive Branch's exercise of these prosecutorial decisions," *Blaszczak*, 56 F.4th at 238, courts, including the Second Circuit, will nonetheless inquire as to whether dismissal would be clearly contrary to the public interest. *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 238-42 (extended discussion of contrary to public interest standard and cases applying it); *see also* JM § 9-2.050 (requiring "a written motion for leave to dismiss . . . explaining fully the reason for the request" to dismiss for cases of public interest as well as for cases involving bribery). At least one court in our district has rejected a dismissal under Rule 48(a) as contrary to the public interest, regardless of the defendant's consent. *See Nederlandsche Combinatie*, 428 F. Supp. at 116-17 ("After reviewing the entire record, the court has determined that a dismissal of the indictment against Mr. Massaut is not in the public interest. Therefore, the government's motion to dismiss as to Mr. Massaut must be and is denied."). The assigned District Judge, the Honorable Dale E. Ho, appears likely to conduct a searching inquiry in this case. Notably, Judge Ho stressed transparency during this case, specifically explaining his strict requirements for non-public filings at the initial conference. (*See* Dkt. 31 at 48-49). And a rigorous inquiry here would be consistent with precedent and practice in this and other districts.

Nor is there any realistic possibility that Adams's consent will prevent a lengthy judicial inquiry that is detrimental to the Department's reputation, regardless of outcome. In that regard,

although the *Flynn* case may come to mind as a comparator, it is distinct in one important way. In that case, the Government moved to dismiss an indictment with the defendant's consent and faced resistance from a skeptical district judge. But in *Flynn*, the Government sought dismissal with prejudice because it had become convinced that there was insufficient evidence that General Flynn had committed any crime. That ultimately made the Government's rationale defensible, because "[i]nsufficient evidence is a quintessential justification for dismissing charges." *In re Flynn*, 961 F.3d 1215, 1221 (D.C. Cir.), *reh'g en banc granted, order vacated*, No. 20-5143, 2020 WL 4355389 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 2020), and *on reh'g en banc*, 973 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Here no one in the Department has expressed any doubts as to Adams's guilt, and even in *Flynn*, the President ultimately chose to cut off the extended and embarrassing litigation over dismissal by granting a pardon.

C. I Cannot in Good Faith Request the Contemplated Dismissal

Because the law does not support a dismissal, and because I am confident that Adams has committed the crimes with which he is charged, I cannot agree to seek a dismissal driven by improper considerations. As Justice Robert Jackson explained, "the prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst." The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 18 ("This authority has been granted by people who really wanted the right thing done—wanted crime eliminated—but also wanted the best in our American traditions preserved."). I understand my duty as a prosecutor to mean enforcing the law impartially, and that includes prosecuting a validly returned indictment regardless whether its dismissal would be politically advantageous, to the defendant or to those who appointed me. A federal prosecutor "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all." *Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

For the reasons explained above, I do not believe there are reasonable arguments in support of a Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss a case that is well supported by the evidence and the law. I understand that Mr. Bove disagrees, and I am mindful of your recent order reiterating prosecutors' duty to make good-faith arguments in support of the Executive Branch's positions. *See* Feb. 5, 2025 Mem. "General Policy Regarding Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of the United States." But because I do not see any good-faith basis for the proposed position, I cannot make such arguments consistent with my duty of candor. N.Y.R.P.C. 3.3; *id.* cmt. 2 ("A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal.").

In particular, the rationale given by Mr. Bove—an exchange between a criminal defendant and the Department of Justice akin to the Bout exchange with Russia—is, as explained above, a bargain that a prosecutor should not make. Moreover, dismissing without prejudice and with the express option of again indicting Adams in the future creates obvious ethical problems, by implicitly threatening future prosecution if Adams's cooperation with enforcing the immigration laws proves unsatisfactory to the Department. *See In re Christoff*, 690 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1997) (disciplining prosecutor for threatening to renew a dormant criminal investigation against a potential candidate for public office in order to dissuade the candidate from running); Bruce A.

Green & Rebecca Roiphe, *Who Should Police Politicization of the DOJ?*, 35 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 671, 681 (2021) (noting that the Arizona Supreme Court disbarred the elected chief prosecutor of Maricopa County, Arizona, and his deputy, in part, for misusing their power to advance the chief prosecutor's partisan political interests). Finally, given the highly generalized accusations of weaponization, weighed against the strength of the evidence against Adams, a court will likely question whether that basis is pretextual. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors*, 228 F. Supp. 483, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (courts "should be satisfied that the reasons advanced for the proposed dismissal are substantial and the real grounds upon which the application is based").

I remain baffled by the rushed and superficial process by which this decision was reached, in seeming collaboration with Adams's counsel and without my direct input on the ultimate stated rationales for dismissal. Mr. Bove admonished me to be mindful of my obligation to zealously defend the interests of the United States and to advance good-faith arguments on behalf of the Administration. I hope you share my view that soliciting and considering the concerns of the U.S. Attorney overseeing the case serves rather than hinders that goal, and that we can find time to meet.

In the event you are unwilling to meet or to reconsider the directive in light of the problems raised by Mr. Bove's memo, I am prepared to offer my resignation. It has been, and continues to be, my honor to serve as a prosecutor in the Southern District of New York.

Very truly yours,



DANIELLE R. SASSOON
United States Attorney
Southern District of New York